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Abstract—This paper exploits the potential of physical layer
security in massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) aided
two-tier heterogeneous networks (HetNets). We focus on the
downlink secure transmission in the presence of multiple eaves-
droppers. We first address the impact of massive MIMO on the
maximum receive power based user association. We then derive
the tractable upper bound expressions for the secrecy outage
probability of a HetNets user. We show that the implementation of
massive MIMO significantly improves the secrecy performance,
which indicates that physical layer security could be a promising
solution for safeguarding massive MIMO HetNets. Furthermore,
we show that the secrecy outage probability of HetNets user first
degrades and then improves with increasing the density of PBSs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security and privacy in 5G networks is of paramount im-
portance [1], [2]. Physical layer security has recently attracted
much attention as a potential security solution at the phys-
ical layer [3]. Such security technique exploits propagation
randomness to establish secret and avoids using ciphering
keys. The FP7 Europe research project PHYLAWS [4] focuses
on the realistic implantation of physical layer security in the
existing and future wireless networks.
Research efforts on the physical layer security have been
made by considering different aspects, such as antenna selec-
tion [5], cooperative jamming [6], and artificial noise [7], etc.
In [8], matched filter precoding and artificial noise generation
was designed to secure downlink transmission in a multicell
massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) system in the
presence of an eavesdropper. In [9], physical layer security
has been investigated in a two-tier downlink HetNets, where
the cooperative femtocells help macrocell achieve the optimal
secrecy transmit beamforming.
In 5G, massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) and
heterogeneous networks (HetNets) are two key enablers. Phys-
ical layer security in massive MIMO enabled HetNets has
not been conducted yet and is in its infancy. We believe that
massive MIMO enabled HetNets is a new highly rewarding
candidate for physical layer security due to the following
factors:
• Base station densities. In HetNets, different tiers have
different base station densities, and small cells are de-
ployed in a large scale to improve the spectrum efficiency.
As such, the distance between the user and its serving
base station is shorter, which in turn decreases the risk
of information leakage.
• Large antenna arrays. Base station with large antenna
array provides large array gain for its legitimate user. As
such, the transmit power level can be cut, and the received
signal power at the eavesdropper is correspondingly re-
duced, due to the fact that the eavesdropper cannot obtain
the array gain.
• Time division duplex. Massive MIMO is recommended
to be applied in time division duplex (TDD) system, to
save the pilot resources. In the TDD mode, base station
estimates the uplink channel via uplink pilot signals from
user, and obtains the downlink channel state information
(CSI) based on the channel reciprocity, which means that
there is no channel training in the downlink. As such,
eavesdropper cannot easily estimate the eavesdropper’s
channel during the downlink transmission.
Motivated by the above, this paper considers physical layer
security in the downlink K-tier HetNets with massive MIMO,
which to the best of our knowledge, has not been studied
yet. Each macrocell base station (MBS) is equipped with
large antenna arrays and uses linear zero-forcing beamforming
(ZFBF) to communicate with dozens of single antenna users
over the same time and frequency band. Each picocell base
station (PBS) equipped with a single antenna serves one single
antenna user for each transmission. We adopt a stochastic
geometry approach to model the different tiers, where the
locations of MBSs, PBSs and eavesdroppers are modelled fol-
lowing independent homogeneous Poisson point processes. We
first address the impact of massive MIMO on the maximum
receive power based user association. We then derive the upper
bound for the secrecy outage probability of a HetNets user, to
show the benefits of massive MIMO. Our results confirms that
using massive MIMO can significantly enhance the secrecy
outage probability of the macrocell user. Furthermore, the
secrecy outage probability of the HetNets user first increases
and then decreases with increasing the density of PBSs.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In the TDD two-tier HetNets consisting of macrocells and
picocells, downlink transmission is considered in the presence
of multiple eavesdroppers. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the first tier represents the class of MBSs. The
MBSs are located following a homogeneous Poisson point
process (HPPP) ΦM with density λM, while the PBSs are
located following an independent HPPP ΦP with density λP.
The eavesdroppers are located following an independent HPPP
ΦE with density λE.
Massive MIMO is adopted in the macrocells [10], where
each N -antenna MBS simultaneously communicates with S
users (N ≫ S ≥ 1), while each PBS and user are single-
antenna nodes. Each MBS uses ZFBF to transmit S data
streams with equal power assignment, such that users that
act as potential malicious eavesdropper can only receive its
information signals. We consider the perfect downlink CSI
and the universal frequency reuse that all the tiers share the
same bandwidth. All the channels undergo independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) quasi-static Rayleigh fading.
A. User Association
We consider user association based on the maximum re-
ceived power, where a user is associated with the BS that
provides the maximum average received power. The average
received power at a user that is connected with the MBS ℓ
(ℓ ∈ ΦM) is expressed as
Pr,M = Ga
PM
S
L (|Xℓ,M|) , (1)
where Ga is the array gain, PM is the MBS’s transmit power,
L (|Xℓ,M|) = β|Xℓ,M|
−αM is the path loss function, β is the
frequency dependent constant value, |Xℓ,M| is the distance,
and α1 is the path loss exponent. The array gain Ga of ZFBF
transmission is N − S + 1 [11].
In the picocell, the long-term average received power at a
user that is connected with the PBS j (j ∈ ΦP) is expressed
as
Pr,P = PPL (|Xj,P|) , (2)
where PP is the PBS’s transmit power and L (|Xj,P |) =
β(|Xj,P|)
−α2 with distance |Xj,P| and path loss exponent α2.
B. Channel Model
All the channels undergo the independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) quasi-static Rayleigh fading. We assume that
a typical user is located at the origin o. The receive signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of a typical user at a
random distance |Xo,M| from its associated MBS is given by
SINRM =
PM
S ho,ML (|Xo,M|)
I1 + δ2
, (3)
where I1 = IM,1 + IS,1, IS,1 =
∑
j∈ΦP
PPhj,PL (|Xj,P|),
IM,1 =
∑
ℓ∈ΦM\Bo,M
PM
S hℓ,ML (|Xℓ,M|), ho,M ∼
Γ (N − S + 1, 1) is the small-scale fading channel power
gain between the typical user and its associated MBS [11],
hj,P ∼ exp(1) and |Xj,P| are the small-scale fading interfering
channel power gain and distance between the typical user and
BS j in the picocell, respectively, hℓ,M ∼ Γ (S, 1) and |Xℓ,M|
are the equivalent small-scale fading interfering channel
power gain and distance between the typical user and MBS
ℓ ∈ ΦM\Bo,M (except the serving BS Bo,M), respectively,
and δ2 is the noise power.
The SINR of a typical user at a random distance |Xo,P|
from its associated PBS Bo,P is given by
SINRP =
PPgo,PL (|Xo,P|)
I2 + δ2
, (4)
where I2 = IM,2 + IS,2, IM,2 =
∑
ℓ∈ΦM
PM
S gℓ,ML (|Xℓ,M|),
IS,2 =
∑
j∈ΦP\Bo,P
PPgj,PL (|Xj,P|), go,P ∼ exp(1) is the
small-scale fading channel power gain between the typical
user and its serving BS, gℓ,M ∼ Γ (S, 1) and |Xℓ,M| are the
equivalent small-scale fading interfering channel power gain
and distance between the typical user and MBS ℓ, respectively,
and gj,P and |Xj,P| are the small-scale fading interfering
channel power gain and distance between the typical user and
BS j ∈ ΦP\Bo,P, respectively, and gj,P ∼ exp(1).
We consider the non-colluding and passive eavesdropping
that each eavesdropper intercepts the signal independently
without any attacks. In this case, we only need to focus on
the most malicious eavesdropper that has the largest receive
SINR. When the MBS transmits the information messages
to its intended user, the receive SINR at the most malicious
eavesdropper is given by
SINRMe∗ = max
e∈ΦE
{
PM
S ho,eL (|Xo,e|)
IA + IM,e + IS,e + δ2
}
, (5)
where ho,e ∼ exp(1) and |Xo,e| are the equivalent small-
scale fading channel power gain and distance between
the eavesdropper and its targeted BS, respectively, IA =
PM
S heL (|Xo,e|) with he ∼ Γ (S − 1, 1) is the intra-cell inter-
ference in the macro cell, IM,e =
∑
ℓ∈ΦM\o
PM
S hℓ,eL (|Xℓ,e|),
hℓ,e ∼ Γ (S, 1) and |Xℓ,e| are the equivalent small-scale
fading interfering channel power gain and distance be-
tween the eavesdropper and MBS ℓ, respectively, IS,e =∑
j∈ΦP
PPhj,P,eL (|Xj,P,e|), hj,P,e ∼ exp(1) and |Xj,P,e|
are the small-scale fading interfering channel power gain
and distance between the eavesdropper and BS j in the
picocell, respectively. Similarly. when the PBS transmits the
information messages to its intended user, the receive SINR
at the most malicious eavesdropper is given by
SINRPe∗ = max
e∈ΦE
{
PPgo,eL (|Xo,e|)
IM,P,e + IS,P,e + δ2
}
, (6)
where go,e ∼ exp(1) and |Xo,e| are the equivalent small-
scale fading channel power gain and distance between the
eavesdropper and its targeted BS, respectively, IM,P,e =∑
ℓ∈ΦM
PM
S gℓ,eL (|Xℓ,e|), gℓ,e ∼ Γ (S, 1) and |Xℓ,e| are
the equivalent small-scale fading interfering channel power
gain and distance between the eavesdropper and MBS ℓ,
respectively, IS,P,e =
∑
j∈ΦP\o
PPgj,P,eL (|Xj,P,e|), gj,P,e ∼
exp(1) and |Xj,P,e| are the small-scale fading interfering
channel power gain and distance between the eavesdropper
and BS j in the picocell, respectively.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE
In an effort to assess the secrecy outage probability of
a HetNets user, we first characterize the impact of massive
MIMO on the cell association probability.
A. User Association Probability
We first derive the PDF of the distance between a typical
user and its serving base station in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. The PDF of the distance |Xo,M| between a typical
user and its serving MBS Bo,M is given by
f|Xo,M| (x) =
2πλM
AM
x exp
{
− πλMx
2
− πλP
(
SPP
(N − S + 1)PM
)2/α2
x2α1/α2
}
.
(7)
In (7), AM is the probability that a typical user is associated
with the MBS
AM =2πλM
∫ ∞
0
r exp
{
− πλMr
2
− πλP
(
SPP
(N − S + 1)PM
)2/α2
r2α1/α2
}
dr. (8)
Lemma 2. The PDF of the distance |Xo,k| between a typical
user and its serving PBS in Bo,P is given by
f|Xo,P| (x) =
2πλP
AP
x exp
{
− πλPx
2
−πλM
(
PM (N − S + 1)
PPS
)
x2α2/α1
}
. (9)
Here, AP is the probability that a typical user is associated
with the PBS, which is given by
AP =2πλP
∫ ∞
0
r exp
{
− πλPr
2
−πλM
(
PM (N − S + 1)
PPS
)
r2α2/α1
}
dr. (10)
Note that Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 can be derived following
the approach in [12].
B. Achievable Ergodic Rate
In this subsection, we derive the achievable ergodic rate of
the macrocell user and the picocell user.
Lemma 3. For a typical user at a random distance |Xo,M|
from its associated MBS, the lower bound on the achievable
ergodic rate of the typical macrocell user is derived as
RLM = log2
(
1 +
PM
S
(N − S + 1) β
(
2πλM
AM
∆
)−1)
, (11)
where
∆ =
∫ ∞
0
(
2πλMPMβx
2−α1
α1 − 2
+
2πλPPPβ
(
DMP (x)
)2−α2
α2 − 2
+ δ2
)
exp
{
−πλMx
2 − πλP
(
DMP (x)
)2}
xα1+1dx. (12)
In (12), DMP (x) =
(
SPP
(N−S+1)PM
)1/α2
xα1/α2 is the minimum
distance between the interfering picocell BS and the typical
marcocell user.
Proof: The achievable ergodic rate of macrocell user is
lower bounded by
E {log2 (1 + SINRM)} ≥ R
L
M = log2
(
1 +
(
E
{
SINRM
−1
})−1)
,
(13)
where
E
{
SINRM
−1
}
=
(
PM
S
(N − S + 1) β
)−1
∫ ∞
0
(
E {I2}+ δ
2
)
xα1f|Xo,M| (x) dx. (14)
In (14), f|Xo,M| (x) is given in (7). Using the Campbell’s
theorem, the expectation of the aggregate interference from
the MBSs and the PBSs is derived as
E {I2} =
2πλMPMβx
2−α1
α1 − 2
+
2πλPPPβ
(
DMP (x)
)2−α2
α2 − 2
.
(15)
Lemma 4. For a typical user at a random distance |Xo,P|
from its associated PBS, the achievable ergodic rate of the
typical picocell user is derived as
RP = E {log2 (1 + SINRP)} =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1− FSINRP (γ)
1 + γ
dγ,
(16)
where
FSINRP (γ) = 1−
2πλP
AP
∫ ∞
0
exp {−2πλMΦ3 (x)− 2πλP
x2γ
α2 − 2
2F1
(
1, 1−
−2
α2
, 2−
2
α2
,−γ
)
−
xα2γδ2
PPβ
−πλPx
2 − πλM
(
PM (N − S + 1)x
α2
PPS
)2/α1}
xdx. (17)
In (17), we have
Φ3 (x) =2F1
[
1− 2/α1, S, 2− 2/α1,−
γPMx
α2
SPP
(
DPM (x)
)α1
]
γPMx
α2
(
DPM (x)
)2−α1
SPP (α1 − 2)
+
S∑
k=2
(
S
k
)
1
α1
(
−
γPMx
α2
SPP
)2/α1
B
(
−
γPMx
α2
SPP
(
DPM (x)
)α1 ; k − 2/α1, 1− S
)
, (18)
where DPM (x) =
(
(N−S+1)PM
SPP
)1/α1
xα2/α1 is the minimum
distance between the interfering macrocell BS and the typical
picocell user, B (·; ·, ·)is the incomplete beta function [13,
8.391], and 2F1 [·, ·, ·] is the Gauss hypergeometric function
[13, 9.142].
Proof: The CDF of SINRP is expressed as
FSINRP (γ) =
∫ ∞
0
Pr
[
go,P ≤
γ
(
I2 + δ
2
)
PPβx−α2
]
f|Xo,P | (x) dx
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
exp
{
−
γδ2xα2
PPβ
}
LI2
(
γxα2
PPPβ
)
f|Xo,P | (x) dx
(19)
To solve the laplace transform of the aggregate interfer-
ence from macrocell BSs and picocell BS, we first uti-
lize LI2
(
γxα2
PPβ
)
= LIM,2
(
γxα2
PPβ
)
LIP,2
(
γxα2
PPβ
)
. The laplace
transform of IM,2 is given by
LIM,2 (s)
= EIM,2
{ ∏
ℓ∈ΦM
Eg
{
exp
(
−s
PMgℓ,Mβ|Xℓ,M|
−α1
S
)}}
(a)
= exp
{
−2πλM
∫ ∞
DP
M
(x)
(
1−
(
1 + s
PMβy
−α1
S
)−S)
ydy
}
,
(20)
where (a) follows from probability generating functional
(PGFL) of PPP [14] and the Cartesian to polar coordinates
transformation. The Laplace transform of IP,2 is given by
LIP,2 (s)
= EIP,2


∏
j∈ΦP\Bo,P
Eg
{
exp
(
−sPPgj,Pβ|Xj,P|
−α2
)}

= exp
(
−2πλP
∫ ∞
x
(
1−
(
1 + sPPβr
−α2
)−1)
rdr
)
.
(21)
Substituting (20) and (21) into (19), we finally derive (17).
C. Secrecy Outage Probability
Secrecy outage probability is the principle performance
metric in the passive eavesdropping scenario. The secrecy
outage is declared when the instantaneous secrecy rate is less
than the targeted secrecy rate Rs [15].
Theorem 1. For a typical user associated with the MBS, the
upper bound on the secrecy outage probability of this typical
user is given by
PMout (Rs) =Pr
{
RM − log2
(
1 + SINRMe∗
)
≤ Rs
}
=1− FSINRM
e∗
(
2(RM−Rs) − 1
)
, (22)
where RM is the lower bound of the ergodic rate of the
macrocell user in (13), Rs is the targeted secrecy rate, and the
CDF of the receive SINR at the most malicious eavesdropper
is derived as
FSINRM
e∗
(γ) = exp
{
−2πλE
∫ ∞
0
exp
{
−γSδ2xα1(βPM)
−1
− 2πλM
S∑
k=1
(
S
k
)
(γxα1)
2/α1Γ (k − 2/α1) Γ (−k + 2/α1 + S)
α1Γ (S)
−
2π2λP
α2
(
γSxα1PP(PM)
−1
)2/α2
Csc [2π/α2]
}
(γ + 1)
−(S−1)
xdx
}
. (23)
Theorem 2. For a typical user associated with the PBS, the
secrecy outage probability of this typical user is derived as
PPout (Rs) =Pr
{
RP − log2
(
1 + SINRPe∗
)
≤ Rs
}
=1− FSINRP
e∗
(
2(RP−Rs) − 1
)
, (24)
where RP is the achievable ergodic rate of the picocell user in
(16), and the CDF of the receive SINR at the most malicious
eavesdropper is given by
FSINRP
e∗
(γ) = exp
{
−2πλE
∫ ∞
0
exp
{
−γδ2xα2(βPP)
−1
− 2πλM
S∑
k=1
(
S
k
)(
γPM
PPS
)2/α1 Γ (−k + 2/α1 + S) Γ (k − 2/α1)
α1Γ (S)
x2α2/α1 −
2π2λP
α2
γ2/α2Csc [2π/α2]x
2
}
xdx
}
. (25)
The results in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 can be derived
following the similar approach in the proof for Lemma 4.
The secrecy outage probability of the HetNets user is given
by
Pout (Rs) = P
M
out (Rs)AM + P
P
out (Rs)AP, (26)
where AM and AP are the user cell association probability in
the macrocell and the picocell, which are derived in (8) and
(10).
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we evaluate the achievable ergodic rate
and the secrecy outage probability of the considered mas-
sive MIMO HetNets based on the analytical results derived
in Section III and Monte Carlo simulation. We consider a
downlink HetNets in a circular region with radius 100m.
In all simulations, we assume that the network operates at
the carrier frequencey 1GHz, the bandwidth is 10MHz, the
transmit power of the MBS is PM = 46 dBm, the transmit
power of the PBS is PP = 37 dBm, the path loss exponent
of macrocell is α1 = 3.5, the path loss exponent of picocell
is α2 = 4, the density of MBSs is λM = 10−3, the density of
eavesdroppers is λE = 10−1, the users simultaneously served
by each MBS is S = 10, and the thermal noise is σ2 = −90
dBm. Both figures show that the analytical plots have a good
match with the simulation plots.
Fig. 1 plots the ergodic rate of the marcocell user and the
picocell user versus the number of antennas at each MBS N
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Fig. 1. Achievable ergodic rate versus the number of antennas at each MBS
using (11) and (16). It is shown that the achievable ergodic rate
improves with increasing N , due to the large array gain. This
indicates that massive MIMO MBS carries more data traffic.
Interestingly, increasing the density of PBSs, the achievable
ergodic rates of the marcocell user and the picocell user
degrade. This is due to the dominant impact of increased
intercell interference brought by the PBSs.
Fig. 2 plots the achievable secrecy outage probability versus
the density of the PBSs. We set the number of antennas at
each MBS as N = 200, and define the targeted secrecy rate
at the marcocell user as Rs = ρRM, and the targeted secrecy
rate at the picocell user as Rs = ρRP. It is assumed that
ρ = 0.5. We see that the secrecy outage probability of the
picocell user decreases with increasing λP, due to the fact
that more interference results in lowering SINRP in (4).
More importantly, the secrecy outage probability of macro-
cell user first degrades then improves with increasing λP. The
reason is that: 1) Increasing λP increases the interference from
PBSs, thus greatly degrades SINRM in (3); 2) For very large
density of PBSs, the interference from the interfering PBSs
dominates SINRMe∗ in (5). Increasing λP greatly decreases
the distance between the interfering PBSs and the typical
eavesdropper, and thus largely decreases SINRMe∗ .
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we took into account the physical layer
security for the downlink massive MIMO HetNets with linear
zero-forcing beamforming (ZFBF), where the non-colluding
malicious eavesdroppers intercept the downlink user’s trans-
mission. Our work demonstrated the importance of BS deploy-
ment density and massive MIMO design on safeguarding the
secure downlink transmission in HetNets.
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